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Abstract—Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems support and control the operation of many critical
infrastructures that our society depend on, such as power grids.
Since SCADA systems become a target for cyber attacks and the
potential impact of a successful attack could lead to disastrous
consequences in the physical world, ensuring the security of
these systems is of vital importance. A fundamental prerequisite
to securing a SCADA system is a clear understanding and
a consistent view of its architecture. However, because of the
complexity and scale of SCADA systems, this is challenging
to acquire. In this paper, we propose a layered architectural
view for SCADA systems, which aims at building a common
ground among stakeholders and supporting the implementation
of security analysis. In order to manage the complexity and
scale, we define four interrelated architectural layers, and uses
the concept of viewpoints to focus on a subset of the system.
We indicate the applicability of our approach in the context of
SCADA system security analysis.
Index Terms—security analysis, SCADA systems, critical in-
frastructure, system architecture
I. INTRODUCTION
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tems are computer systems that monitor and control industrial
facilities and processes. Many critical infrastructures such as
power grid, traffic management, gas and water facilities are
supported and controlled by SCADA systems. In SCADA sys-
tems, computer applications as well as human operators in the
control center collect measurements from remotely connected
sensors and send commands to actuators in the field according
to predefined process models. Hence, SCADA systems help
to extend the activities in the cyber space to the physical
world. Because of the critical nature of the physical devices
and services they monitor and control, SCADA systems are
a ready target for cyber attacks. Historically, most SCADA
systems had been separated from other networks and used
proprietary protocols, hardware and software. However, in
recent years, due to technological development and economic
considerations, SCADA systems are becoming increasingly
interconnected and tend to use Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) IT products as well as open standards. For example,
in many cases, SCADA systems are connected to an organiza-
tion’s enterprise networks, which are in-turn connected to the
Internet. Consequently, SCADA systems have to face the same
vulnerabilities and threats that plague normal IT systems. In
addition, connectivity and the use of COTS products makes it
easier for an attacker to understand and search for weakness
in the system. Stuxnet [1] is a well-exposed wakeup call on
the imminent danger facing SCADA systems and our critical
infrastructures.
Identifying the vulnerabilities and threats and protecting
SCADA systems against cyber attacks is of vital importance.
However, due to their characteristics this is not straightfor-
ward. SCADA systems tend to be complex, for example,
because of the heterogeneity of the systems and communica-
tion technologies they use, and large-scale in nature. Besides,
SCADA systems have very strict real-time requirements, and
the lifecycle of SCADA systems tends to be much longer than
normal IT systems. This makes changing and hardening the
infrastructure for security purposes difficult. A summary of
the challenges of securing SCADA networks is discussed by
Igure et al. in [2], and a set of best practice solutions are given
by [3]. Despite this being an acknowledged problem, securing
SCADA systems continues to be a significant challenge [4],
[5].
Clearly, to secure SCADA systems a systematic approach
must be taken. Security processes that makes use of existing
best practices and guidelines are a promising approach be-
cause they are more likely to be adopted by today’s critical
infrastructure asset owners. A fundamental building block in
any of the security process is security analysis, which aims
at identifying assets, vulnerabilities, and the associated threats
and potential attacks. A prerequisite of security analysis is
to gain a systematic and comprehensive understanding of
the SCADA system under consideration. Due to their scale,
complexity, and heterogeneity, a consistent view rarely exist
(cf. Section II). To this end, we propose a novel way to
organize and describe SCADA systems and their environments
and contexts using architectural layers. As often required in
software design-level risk analysis, the layered architectural
view is envisioned to assist security analysis by slicing and
organizing SCADA system to different technological concerns
and layers of abstraction in order to build up a consistent
“forest-level” view of the target system at a reasonably high
level [6].
Our architectural view is comprised of four interrelated
layers: asset, communication, service, and organization layer,
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which capture important aspects of a SCADA system from
a security perspective. The established layered architectural
view can be applied during the process of vulnerability and
threat analysis, risk assessment and secure architecture design.
To manage the scale and complexity of SCADA systems, we
also make use of viewpoints to make intersections through the
layers when they are applied to specific security-related tasks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section II,
we describe related work and motivate the need for a novel
architectural view for SCADA systems. Section III describes
our approach to establish the architectural view, including a set
of principles associated with the four layers. We also introduce
the use of viewpoints to manage SCADA system complexity
and scale. To indicate the applicability, in Section IV we
discuss its usage in the context of a set of security-related
processes. Section V concludes the paper and points out our
further work.
II. RELATED WORK
A consistent architectural view establishes a framework for
understanding the target system, the entities within the system
and their relationships, and system environments. When under-
taking security processes that involve different organizations
and personnel, a reference architectural view helps to maintain
consistency and common consensus among the participants.
Most common approaches so far are to model a SCADA
system in accordance with its network topology. For example,
a typical SCADA architecture for power grid includes field de-
vices connected to the SCADA network, which is connected to
a corporate network [7]. This architectural approach is adapted
in [8] for developing simulation tools for SCADA systems
security. Such a topological view of the architecture is also
used in [3], [2], [9]. In our approach, details of the network
infrastructure are captured in a distinct layer that describes
how data may flow in a SCADA system; additionally, we
would like to capture other aspects that are equally important
from a security perspective.
Other approaches focus on the software services within
SCADA systems. The VIKING reference architecture [10]
models services and data flow, and their relationship to the
network topology. An architecture meta-model includes three
components: data-flow, service, and zone. In our approach,
these aspects are modeled across different layers, making
it more straightforward to identify and analyze the security
aspects of each of the entities. Coupled with viewpoints,
our layers can be collapse to consider multiple layers in
security analysis. The ability to identify and classify interde-
pendencies within SCADA systems is important for security.
Berg and Stamp [11] propose a system reference architecture
by applying Object-Role Modeling [12] in order to model
data, functionality and internal interdependencies of SCADA
systems. In their approach, an object represents the features
and properties of a system entity, and a role annotates the
relationship between the objects. The objects in a SCADA
system are grouped into four levels – infrastructure equipment,
SCADA field equipment, systems and plant control centers,
and automation oversight. This organization is based on a mix-
ture of function and network topology. As mentioned earlier,
we separate infrastructure and networking aspects into distinct
layers in order to make their analysis more approachable.
Using viewpoints, we can also collapse the layers in case of
carrying out the object role modeling proposed by Berg and
Stamp.
A slightly different approach is to first identify SCADA de-
vices and then logically group their functions into abstraction
layers. The ISA S99 standard [13] proposes to create a refer-
ence architecture from the entities identified as assets within
an organization, and build the architecture model according to
the specifics of the organization. ISA S99 maps the functional
components of a SCADA system into five architectural levels:
physical process, local or basic control, supervisory control,
operations management, and enterprise systems. Our approach
follows the same principle, i.e., we propose to first build an
asset layer as the basis for other layers.
The authors of [14], [15] propose a SCADA reference
architecture with added architectural components for security
and resilience. In their approach, the entire SCADA architec-
ture is modeled as a wide area network connecting several
local area networks. SCADA entities are distributed within
the boundaries of each of the local networks. In essence, such
an architectural view focuses only on the hostile environment
connecting the local networks.
Based on our study of existing work, it can be observed
that there is no consensus on how to model SCADA system
architectures, including what should be modeled. However,
system architectures tend to be modeled to reflect network
segmentation. Indeed, there is no single solution that provides
us with a comprehensive and tailorable view of a SCADA
system architecture for use when applying security analysis.
III. LAYERED ARCHITECTURAL VIEW
A reference architecture should capture the essence of the
architecture of a collection of systems [16]. Our architectural
view is structured into four layers, which can be considered
in the context of arbitrary viewpoints. This arrangement is
summarized in Figure 1. Each layer is intended to group
system components and aspects for security analysis. A layer
in the architecture consists of entities that are typically consid-
ered discrete – for example, the communication layer includes
aspects from layer two and three of the OSI reference model,
and the asset layer describes physical and logical entities.
Since each SCADA system is unique, e.g., using a range of
components and subsystems from different vendors configured
in different ways, it is impossible to have an architecture model
that captures all peculiarities of different SCADA systems
working in different organizations and domains. Therefore, our
proposal here is meant to be an architectural template, based
on which specific SCADA system architectural views can be
derived and instantiated.
To further manage the complexity and scale of SCADA
systems, we make use of the concept of viewpoints. A view-
point is a technique for abstraction using a selected set of
Asset
Communication
Service
NetA NetB NetDNetC
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n Start
Finish
ViewpointA ViewpointB
Fig. 1. Layered SCADA system architectural view
architectural concepts and structuring rules, in order to focus
on particular concerns within that system [17]. We define a
viewpoint to be an arbitrary view of a SCADA system that
focuses on a subset of the system. A viewpoint can include
system components from the same architectural layer as well
as those from different layers. A viewpoint may be defined,
for example, in order to understand the vulnerability associated
with a new aspect of a SCADA system or to determine the
implementation of a high-level security policy via processes,
software and hardware.
A. Asset Layer
The asset layer includes entities such as hardware, software,
and data of a SCADA system that is usually considered
as the IT asset of an organization. Hardware of a SCADA
system are physical devices as well as the communication
links that connect them. Devices in a SCADA system can
include those typically associated with enterprise networks,
such as workstations and servers, and those that are related to
SCADA systems, such as field devices, including Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IDEs), Remote Terminal Unit (RTUs),
Programmable Logic Controller (PLCs) and Distributed Con-
trol Systems (DCS). The field devices monitor meter readings
and equipment status and control end devices such as sensors
and actuators. Usually, the wired and wireless communica-
tion links connect the devices into the following topologies:
geographically distributed field devices are connected over
various communication links (e.g., dial-up telephone, leased
line, power line, radio, and Wide Area Network (WAN)) to
control centers in SCADA networks; the SCADA network is
connected to a company’s corporate network, and the corporate
network is further connected to the Internet; firewalls are used
to separate and protect different networks. Software include
operating systems, databases, and application software. Data
is generated and processed by hardware and software compo-
nents in SCADA systems. In the asset layer, the software and
data are associated with specific hardware. Figure 2 illustrates
an example of asset layer.
Components in the asset layer should be relatively straight-
forward to identify. For example, a critical infrastructure
asset owner typically has detailed information on each of
the hardware devices and how they are connected – e.g.,
maintained in an asset management system – as well as the
software installed on that hardware and the data exchanged at
the I/O ports or APIs. The components can be specified using
common IT asset specification methods like the “Specification
for asset identification” from NIST [18], which defines a data
model with asset types such as software, database, network,
and service etc.
B. Communication Layer
The way data can be transmitted and the means of realizing
these data flows, e.g., using various protocols and services, is
important for SCADA system security – the communication
layer aims to describe this. This understanding can be applied
when carrying out a threat analysis to determine the reach-
ability of critical assets from remote networks, both internal
and external. Furthermore, understanding which protocols are
being used can identify vulnerabilities in the SCADA system.
Building on top of the entities described in the asset layer, the
characteristics of three main classes of entity are described
in this layer: (1) communication enablers, (2) communication
inhibitors, and (3) communication end points, as shown in
Figure 3.
Communication enablers include devices such as network
hubs, switches and routers, for example; a further form of
enabler includes the means of interconnecting these devices,
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Fig. 2. Asset layer
physically or virtually, e.g., with the use of Virtual Local
Area Networks (VLANs). In short, communication enablers
describe and implement how data should flow through the
SCADA system. In contrast to the various communication
enablers, inhibitors curb the flow of data through the SCADA
system, and typically take the form of so-called middleboxes,
such as firewalls and Network Address Translation (NAT)
devices. An intrinsic communication inhibitor in SCADA
systems can come from the heterogeneity of the protocols
that are used. For example, TCP/IP is the ubiquitous protocol
arrangement in enterprise networks; whereas in control net-
works a wide-range of protocols are used, such as DNP3 and
Modbus. The communication end points are entities sending
or receiving data.
With respect to the communication enablers and inhibitors
three main attributes should be enumerated: (1) the addressing
layout (or configuration) of the SCADA system, e.g., in terms
of network and subnetwork address ranges; (2) the protocols
and services that are used; and (3) the state associated with
these protocols and services. Collectively, these three items de-
fine how data can flow through the SCADA system. Enabling
protocols include those used for routing (e.g., OSPF and BGP)
and their state includes items such as their configuration and
routes held in routing tables. Inhibiting services include those
running on firewalls and their associated rule set.
Furthermore, there are typically a number of services that
support communication in a SCADA system, such as man-
agement and measurement services (e.g., SNMP and Netflow
data collection, respectively). Determining the existence and
configuration of these services is important, for example, to
understand vulnerabilities at this layer.
C. Service Layer
The service layer models the software services, applications,
or functions in SCADA systems and the data exchanged
among the services. We use the term “service” in a broad sense
to denote software components that encapsulate and provide
certain functionality. Consequently, databases, authentication
servers, Web servers and application servers are considered
services. A service can be a composition of standalone services
which provides customized functionalities and business appli-
cations. A service can be implemented and deployed using
numerous techniques, ranging from low-level embedded sys-
tems components to application software and flexible service
mashups and orchestration engines. The data flows models the
data exchanges among the services.
An example service layer is illustrated in Figure 4, which
is a simplified version adapted from [10]. Services like sensor
and actuator send measurement data and receive process
commands to and from SCADA server through front end. HMI
services are the interfaces of the operators to the SCADA
server. Historian stores the historical data. A web browser
in the corporate network can access these data. The SCADA
application server provides various control center applications
such as power projects and overview monitoring. A Geo-
graphic Information System (GIS) service provides GIS data
to data engineering server, which defines data structures and
views for various services in the SCADA network. Commu-
nication server allows remote client to have terminal access
to SCADA server for faster and more efficient maintenance
work and information acquiring.
Adapting some of the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA)
terminology, we can describe a service with the following
attributes: (1) Service Descriptions define the capabilities and
functional properties of a service, as well as the communi-
cation endpoint and operations supported by the service; (2)
Interactions and Data Contracts, which define the schema
used for exchanged messages as well as the protocol of in-
teraction; (3) Fault Handling Procedures provide information
in case of failures and undeliverable services; (4) Service Level
Agreements hold important information about guaranteed qual-
ity criteria, such as availability, accuracy, responsiveness and
so on. While these definitions are more feasible for business
software in cooperate networks, the same concepts are also
applicable to services in SCADA networks. For instance, in
order to use a deployed firmware-controlled sensor, one needs
to know the protocol and applicable messages to interact with
this sensor; furthermore, what operations this sensor provides
(type of measurement, value ranges, operating modes), how
faults are signalized, and what level of service in terms of
availability or accuracy this sensor guarantees.
Describing software as services with encapsulated functions
makes it easier to model SCADA systems with legacy and
proprietary software components. With a certain level of
abstraction, the service layer enable us to focus on security
of distributed information systems. For example, on a service
layer, it is possible to identify vulnerabilities of one particular
service, e.g., because of using a weakly implemented version,
or applying an inappropriate configuration which might cause
open backdoors. Furthermore, it is also possible to identify
vulnerabilities due to compositional aspects. For example, a
standalone secure service B being composed with a vulnerable
service A can be exploited, because A provides an attack
surface to B, e.g., a backdoor in A is used to reach B. On
the other side, an application can also be vulnerable resulting
from bad design, even if the single services are secure. This
happens, for example, if services are not composed in the right
manner, such as a data provisioning service reachable from
the Internet lacks a composition with a proper authentication
service. However, in order to ensure the usage of appropriate
compositions and security configuration of single software
components, we also need to model corporate security policies
on an organizational level.
D. Organization Layer
The organization layer consists of relevant people and
their activities, as described by organizational processes and
policies. As an orthogonal layer, the entities in the organi-
zation layer are related in different ways to the other layers.
This includes end-users of services provisioned by SCADA
systems as well as maintenance personnel keeping the whole
infrastructure up and running. People on an organization
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layer have predefined privileges (e.g., roles and access rights)
on peer objects, including hardware, network configurations,
services and data entities. A majority of an organization’s
activities can be described by business processes. Business
processes can potentially span numerous departments across
organization boundaries. Business requirements and corporate
rules affect the execution of business processes, i.e., the order
and context of tasks being performed. Furthermore, in most
processes coordination through and intervention of humans
is required, which makes people not only system end-users,
but integral parts of the whole system architecture. When
executing such processes, predefined tasks are performed by
different stakeholders in series. This requires the delegation of
privileges among people, for instance, the ownership of data
objects depending on the current task. Finally, the execution
of processes is influenced by security policies and guidelines,
especially, how close they are lived and applied in the business
context. Thorough monitoring of user actions and review
with respect to these security-relevant artifacts can reveal
weaknesses in corporate procedures.
We regard security policies, which describe security ad-
ministration rules and enforcement hierarchy, as an integral
part of the organization layer. Security policies include those
for general IT systems, such as information security and risk
management policies, as well as specific policies for SCADA
systems such as platform security, communication security,
and application security policies [19].
E. Viewpoints
As mentioned earlier, viewpoints are intended to provide
a focused view of a subset of the architectural layers. A
viewpoint can be horizontally aligned to a layer, or vertically
intersect different layers.
Viewpoints can be arbitrarily defined based on the security
process that is being carried out. For example, a security
team may wish to validate how an organizational level se-
curity policy is implemented from a technology and processes
perspective. To do this they may define a set of viewpoints
from the perspective of the different security policies under
examination, which cuts across the organizational, service and
communication layers, for example. This could reveal how
a security policy is implemented in service access control
mechanisms and firewall policies.
A key challenge when defining viewpoints is determining
their scope, i.e., identifying the SCADA system entities that
are relevant with respect to a proposed viewpoint. In our refer-
ence architecture the interdependencies and other relationships
between entities in the various layers will be modeled, e.g., the
dependency of a service and its composition on the commu-
nication and physical infrastructure. We are exploring how a
viewpoint might be semi-automatically abstracted from these
relationships as a graph, for example, as a polytree – a form
of directed acyclic graph that has a single path between two
vertices – whose edges are determined based on conditional
probabilities, such as that of being in a compromised state.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The precise nature of the instantiation of the architectural
view, e.g., which entities will be enumerated and their at-
tributes in accordance with the architectural template, will
depend on its application to the security analysis of spe-
cific SCADA systems. A security team can make use of
abstract representations of the architectural view to manage
the complexity and scale of the system, and to introduce
some automation to the process. We foresee a number of
applications of our reference architecture. For example, we
can use the framework from Schaeffer et al. [20] for develop-
ing and evaluating so-called resilience patterns that describe
the configuration of various mechanisms, e.g., firewalls and
anomaly detection systems, that can be used to detect and
mitigate well-known attacks, such as DDoS attacks. Their
framework makes use of simulations to evaluate candidate
resilience patterns; our reference architecture could be used
to support the realisation of simulation models in this context.
In a more formal way, we can apply the layered architectural
view for attack modeling in smart grid proposed by Chen et
al. [21] that makes use of Petri-nets. In their approach, “low-
level” Petri-nets are created by domain experts that describe
attacks in detail for sub-domains of a smart grid, e.g., attacks
on smart meters. Then the low-level attack descriptions are
merged with “high-level” Petri-nets that abstract details of
an attack, and focus on important places, i.e., attack states.
Common places in the two types of Petri-net are merged by
identifying the transitions and places described by a common
model description language. Using the layered architectural
view, we can support this attack modeling approach – for
example, the systematic identification of low-level Petri-nets
could be done on a per-layer basis, and viewpoints could be
defined that identify places and their attributes across multiple
layers. Furthermore, the lexicon of the model description
language could be derived from the attributes contained in
an instantiation of our reference architecture.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Since SCADA systems are the IT backbone of many critical
infrastructures, security analysis that identifies vulnerabilities,
threats and attacks is an important task for securing and
protecting critical infrastructures against cyber attacks. Estab-
lishing a consistent architectural view of the target system
shoiuld be the first step in any security analysis. In this
paper, we proposed a layered architectural view to support
the implementation of security analysis. As a novel way
to organize and describe architectural information and to
manage complexity and scale, we model SCADA systems in
four layers: asset, communication, service, and organization
layer. In addition, we introduced the concept of architectural
viewpoints, which enables us to have a focused view on a
subset of the system of interest during security analysis. We are
aware that it is a challenging task to enforce a unanimous view
on SCADA system architecture among various stakeholders.
The proposed architectural view is an attempt to establish and
maintain a consistent view on the system architecture during
security processes. With abstract and focused presentations
in the architectural view, we envision that more theoretical
and formal methods, as well as automation techniques can
be developed and applied for security analysis in SCADA
systems.
There are several directions for our future work: we will
apply the architectural view in a research project that aims at
preventing and protecting critical infrastructure against cyber
attacks to gain more practical experiences of the feasibility of
our approach. The architectural view captures interdependency
among components within a SCADA system, which can be ex-
ploited for identifying interrelated vulnerabilities and threats.
SCADA systems are complex and typically in large scale. Tool
support for efficient instantiation of the architectural view will
be another objective in our future work.
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